Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Faculty Working Papers

Lubin School of Business

11-1-2008

PCAOB Inspection Process: An Objective,
Comprehensive Assessment is Justified
Bernard H. Newman
Department of Accounting, Lubin School of Business, Pace University

Mary Ellen Oliverio
Department of Accounting, Lubin School of Business, Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lubinfaculty_workingpapers
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Commons
Recommended Citation
Newman, Bernard H. and Oliverio, Mary Ellen, "PCAOB Inspection Process: An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified"
(2008). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 64.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lubinfaculty_workingpapers/64

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lubin School of Business at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact rracelis@pace.edu.

PCAOB Inspection Process:
An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified
Bernard H. Newman
and
Mary Ellen Oliverio
Department of Accounting
Lubin School of Business
Pace University
New York, NY 10038

This is an updated version of an earlier draft of the paper presented at the
American Accounting Association, Mid-Atlantic Regional Conference
Parsippany, NJ on April 20, 2007

PCAOB Inspection Process:
An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified
Abstract
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is charged with
performing inspections of registered accounting firms. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Section 104) Basically, inspections are to “assess the degree of
compliance. . . with the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission,
or professional standards.
The inspection process has many aspects. Matters that have been discussed
include timeliness of reports, extent of public disclosure of findings, qualifications
of inspections, and the nature of the inspection process. Only the last identified
matter, the nature of the inspection process, is the subject of this paper.
After a review of the administrative structure for inspections, of the nature of the
current inspection process, a tentative list of postulates is provided following by
questions about the current process and a concluding summary.
The review provides the following brief summary:
1, The current inspection strategy does not appear to reflect an assessment of
the degree of compliance. The process, as reflected in inspection reports, is
that of a consulting engagement that has its purpose to aid the entity reviewed in
understanding where deficiencies are serious. The Board’s declaration that an
inspection follows a “supervisory approach” seems related to consulting not
compliance.
2. After more than five years of implementing the inspection process, the
PCAOB has not established a clear, consistent model for inspections. Therefore,
no generalizations about audit performance can be provided.
3. An objective, comprehensive assessment of the process in relation to what
was needed at the time of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
appears justified. That assessment must go beyond the inspection process
itself, however. What is presented here is exploratory.
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PCAOB Inspection Process:
An Objective, Comprehensive Assessment is Justified
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is charged with a
continuing program of inspection of registered firms. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Section 104) Basically, inspections are “to assess the degree of
compliance. . . with this Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission,
or professional standards.” Accounting firms undergo inspections yearly if they
provide audit reports “for more than 100 issuers and at least triennially if such
firms that provide audit reports for fewer issuers.”
There are many aspects of the inspection task assigned to the PCAOB which
have been subject to discussion and review. Matters that have been discussed
include timeliness of reports, extent of public disclosure of findings, qualifications
of inspectors, and the nature of the inspection process. It is the last topic only
that is the subject of this paper.
The following topics are discussed: 1. PCAOB’s administrative structure for
inspections; 2. Initial limited Inspections 3. The nature and limitations of full
scale Inspections; 4. Perceptions of inspection process in the business press;
5. Postulates needed for framework of an inspection that determines
compliance; 6.. Questions about the current inspection process; and 7.
Summary..
1. The PCAOB Administrative Structure for Inspections
The PCAOB division responsible for administrating the inspection process is
Registration and Inspections. It is headed by a director who is supported by
three deputy directors. The Division’s expenditures for 2007 totaled $65.7
Million (50.3 percent of total expenditures) compared to $63.0 Million in 2006
(49.7 percent of total expenditures)
As reported in the PCAOB 2007 Annual Report, there were 236 registered
companies inspected. Of these there were 10, including one Canadian firm, that
audited 100 or more publicly-owned companies. Of the 226 firms, 179 were
U. S. firms, the other 47 were non U. S. firms located in 16 countries. The
PCAOB conducted 44 percent of the inspections from one of their offices, which
are in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, Orange County, San
Francisco, and Washington, D. C.
The PCAOB annual reports note that Board’s inspection teams are experienced
accountants. Leaders of teams in 2007, for example, had an average of 23
years of relevant experience and all other members of teams had an average of
15 years of relevant experience.
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2. Initial Limited Inspections
Initially, the PCAOB did not begin full scale inspections. The Board during its
initial year of functioning (2003) determined that limited inspection of the four
largest U. S. firms would be undertaken. The Board’s opinion was that such
inspections were feasible and would serve the public interest and provide “an
important foundation for full-scale inspections.” (PCAOB, August 26, 2004,
Release No. 104-2994-001) The full-scale inspection process began in 2004.
Attention to the Act’s Specifications
The limited inspections included the three components that were identified in the
Act for full-scale inspections:
a. An inspection and review of selected audit and review engagements of
the firm, performed at various offices and by various associated persons
of the firm.
b. An evaluation of the sufficiency of the quality control system of the firm,
and the manner of the documentation and communication of that system
by the firm; and
c. Performance of such other testing of the audit, supervisory, and quality
control procedures of the firm as are necessary or appropriate in light of
the purpose of the inspection and the responsibility of the Board.
The Process
In each of the four limited inspections 16 audits were selected for review. As
would be the case for all inspections, the PCAOB inspection staff selected the
audits to be reviewed and in no instance was the firm allowed “to limit or to
influence the selection process.” Additionally, the staff selected “certain subject
matters for review, such as revenues, reserves or estimated liabilities, related
party transactions, supervision of work performed by foreign affiliates, the
assessment of risk by the audit team and journal entries and adjustments.”
The limited inspections were completed for three of the four largest U. S. firms in
the period from June 2003 to January 2004. (The period was indicated as noted
here.) All four reports were issued on August 26, 2004. There was no disclosure
of how many inspectors were assigned to each or how many hours were spent
during the periods indicated.
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Reports Provided
Reports of all four firms indicated deficiencies in audit performance. All, for
example, had failed to properly apply EITF 95-22. In all firms there were issuers
who had to restate their financial statements. (There were 3 such restatements
for the clients of two firms; 6 for clients of one firm and 8 for clients of one firm).
The following statement (or one expressing the same thought) was included in
each of the four reports: “In addition, some of the audit engagements reviewed
were found to involve some degree of departure from PCAOB standards or the
firm’s own quality control policies or both.” Such departures were not disclosed
in the public reports of these limited inspections.
Follow Up from Limited Inspections
A press release from Nicolaisen, the Chief Accountant at the SEC, on the date of
issuance of the report of the four registered audit firms included the following:
The goal of these reviews is to improve audit quality and thereby enhance
financial reporting and the integrity of our markets. Although the
Commission was not involved in the preparation of the reports, based on
my initial reading, the PCAOB’s process appears to be thorough and the
reports are candid and transparent. While I am disappointed with the
findings of the reports, it is important to keep in mind that this is the first
inspection which covers a period during which the firms were undergoing
significant change following the July 2002 enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act. The reports indicate that each of the four firms reviewed need
to improve the quality of their audits. (Nicolaisen, SEC Press Statement,
August 26, 2004)
On the date the four reports were issued, the PCAOB noted the nature of the
inspection report process and the public availability of information in the reports.
This report notes, though:
The public portions of the inspection reports issued today include two
general categories of information. First, the reports include detailed
descriptions of the types of matters on which the Board focused its
inspection procedures, and the procedures the Board staff carried out to
examine those matters. Because these are the Board’s first reports, the
Board is providing somewhat more detail about procedures than future
reports will typically include. (PCAOB, Press Release 104-2004-001)
The report reflects the Board’s understanding of what is required to establish
legally a violation of professional standards and notes:
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. . . the Board is sensitive to the fact that a firm’s cooperation in
constructively addressing an issue in a supervisory regulatory context is
not the same thing as the firm admitting, for any legal purpose, a fact or a
violation. For these reasons, the Board emphasizes that an inspection
report’s descriptions of departures from professional standards are not the
result of an adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute
conclusion finding of fact or of violations for purposes of imposing legal
liability. (PCAOB, Press Release 104-2004-001)
Pursuant to Section 104 (g) (2) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, no portion of the
limited reports dealing with criticisms of a firm’s quality control systems was
made public. (However, there had been a brief comment about this matter in the
reports from the limited inspections, as noted earlier in this paper.) Each firm
knew that the Board would publicly disclose such criticisms if the firm failed to
address them to the Board’s satisfaction within twelve months of the issuance of
the report. All four firms submitted reports concerning their efforts to deal with
criticisms identified. The Board issued a Release about the initial implementation
of the process for addressing quality control. The Board’s conclusion was: “ [the
firms] have crafted and undertaken important steps that, if consciously
implemented, will have beneficial efforts on audit quality.” (PCAOB Release 1042006-78) That statement doesn’t quite declare that the problems were resolved.
This ambiguous statement is disappointing inasmuch as it provides no clue to
how easy or difficult it is to resolve quality control problems.
Then, the Report continues with listings of “steps that emerged from the review
process in which each of the four firms engaged as they responded to criticisms
of their quality control systems. There were seven categories identified. To
illustrate the nature of steps, two items from the first two categories were:
Audit performance:
•

•

changing the organizational structure so that responsibility for ethics,
independence, client acceptance, and audit quality monitoring is
separated from responsibility for audit operations and business
development with a separate and direct reporting line to the firm
Chairman,
adding a new requirement to include, in the audit documentation, evidence
of engagement partner and manager involvement in, and review of,
certain detailed work papers; (PCOB, Release 104-2006-78)

Internal inspections:
•
•

increasing the number of engagements subject to internal inspection;
making changes to affect the internal perception of participation as a
reviewer in the firm’s internal program by, for example, making clear
that participation in the program is an indication that an individual is
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viewed as a top performer and that it is an important developmental
step in the career path of any senior manager who aspires to
partnership, rather than being treated as a distraction from other
responsibilities viewed as more important to advancement in the firm.
(PCAOB, Release 104-2006-78)
3. The Nature and Limitations of Full Scale Inspections
The PCAOB transformed the requirement of the Act to “determine compliance
with relevant rules and regulations” into a supervisory style of inspection with
focus on self improvement. Noted in the Board’s 2007 Annual Report is the
following::
From the viewpoint of public investors, the most important features of the
supervisory model are the effects the PCAOB’s program have on
strengthening quality control and risk-management practices of registered
firms and, in a broader sense, achieving more consistent compliance with
applicable professional standards. (PCAOB 2007 Annual Report)
In earlier annual reports, the PCAOB, had underscored that the supervisory
approach encourages firms to improve their practices and procedures.
The Strategy for an Inspection
Inspections are not identical from one firm to another. There is no basis,
therefore, for determining the quality of audits performed by a single firm or all
firms inspected in a year, therefore. (Given the status of measurement of audit
quality there is support for not providing a measure of quality at the firm level;
however, it is not clear that a macro level assessment (of all firms for a year)
could not be tentatively determined, at least for the Board’s consideration, if not
sufficiently valid for public disclosure.
As noted in the Board’s annual reports, inspections include only portions of
selected audit engagements performed in the prior year by each registered firm
undergoing an inspection. Engagements, as well as portions of engagements,
are selected for inspection primarily based on an assessment of the risk of
material misstatement or significant audit deficiencies as well as other firmspecific risks. (PCAOB, 2007 Annual Report)
The focus is on aspects of the selected audits that are most likely to present
“challenging issues.” This risk-based approach is the result of cooperative efforts
between the Division of Registration and Inspection and the Office of Research
and Analysis. (2007 PCAOB Annual Report)
During the process, while maintaining “a constructive, arms-length dialogue with
the registered firm, identified deficiencies are discussed with the Firm’s staff
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members related to the auditing process and/or to the particular audits under
review.
Each inspection has two components: inspection of selected audit engagements
and assessment of quality control factors that are considered critical in the
consistent quality performance of audits. Disclosure requirements for the two
component differ, however.
Disclosure in Inspection Reports
A written report of the findings of an inspection is required. However, as noted
by one Board member, Niemeier: “The reports are not designed or intended to
rate firms according to a scorecard. . . .” He later commented: “The primary
purpose of PCAOB reports is to further the dialogue between the Board and the
firm about areas where the firm can improve its auditing.” (Niemeier)
Complete disclosure of findings is not provided to the public In an effort to
protect what is perceived to be confidential and proprietary information, the
Board may further limit disclosures, beyond those related to quality control
systems.
Deficiencies in Audits. The findings related to deficiencies noted in the review of
selected audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial
reporting are included in the public portion of the inspection report. The
inspection team alerts the firm to the deficiencies during the inspection process
and in those instances where the team’s judgment is that “those deficiencies that
exceed a certain significance threshold are summarized without disclosure of the
client.” Such deficiencies are identified in the publicly issued report as related to
Issuer A, Issuer B, etc.
Each full-scale inspection report includes a statement about the meaning of
deficiencies identified. That statement generally includes:
First, inclusion in an inspection report does not mean that the deficiency
remained unaddressed after the inspection team brought it to the firm’s
attention. Under PCAOB standards, a firm must take appropriate action to
assess the importance of the deficiency to the firm’s present ability to
support its previously expressed audit opinions. . . A Board inspection
does not typically include review of a firm’s actions to address deficiencies
identified, but the Board expects the firms are attempting to take
appropriate action. (see initial pages of an inspection report or PCAOB
Release No. 104-2007-001)
Generalizations not Warranted. The limitations for generalizing from reading a
firm’s annual inspection report are noted in each report:
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.

. . the Board cautions against drawing conclusion about the comparative
merits of the annually inspected firms based on the number of reported
deficiencies in any given year. The total number of audits reviewed is a
small portion of the total audit performed. . . and the frequency of
deficiencies identified does not necessarily represent the frequency of
deficiencies throughout the firm’s practice. . . . if the Board discovers a
potential weakness during an inspection, the Board may revise its
inspection plan to target additional audits . . . .(See any inspection report
posted at the PCAOB website)

Quality Control Findings. There is explicit specification that
“ . . . no portions of the inspection report that deal with criticisms or
potential defects in the quality control systems of the firm under inspection
shall be public if such criticisms or defects are addressed by the firm, to
the satisfaction of the Board, not later than twelve months after the date of
the inspection report. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 104, (g) (2))
weakness and this may increase the number of deficiencies reported for
that firm in that year. (See any initial pages of an inspection report)
Supervisory Context is Highlighted. An inspection team is not performing a
legally-driven engagement with a specified measurement of compliance.
References to violations or potential violations of laws, rules, professional
standards are to be understood in the supervisory context in which a report is
prepared. As noted in each inspection report:
. . . any such references are not a result of an adversarial adjudicative
process and do not constitute conclusive findings of fact or of violations for
purposes of imposing legal liability. Similarly, any description herein of a
firm’s cooperation in addressing issues constructively should not be
construed, and is not construed by the Board, as an admission, for
purposes of potential legal liability, of any violation. (See initial pages of
an inspection report.)
4. Perceptions of the Inspection Process
There is limited discussion of the effectiveness of the inspection process
available at the PCAOB website or in professional accounting literature. Among
the references found through a Google search using the phrase PCAOB
inspection process revealed a few relevant references. A search of ABI-Inform,
using the same phrase, resulted in 15 items, most were merely discussing the
process; few provided any critical assessments.

9

The Overall Inspection Process
In an article discussing William McDonough’s leadership style after he had left
the PCOAB and had joined Merrill Lynch as vice chairman, there was reference
to his experience in serving as the first chairman of PCAOB. This comment was
made:
McDonough pushed forward, molding the PCAB to act more as an
inspector than as an enforcer. From his term at the Fed, which has
certain regulatory responsibilities over banks, McDonough knew that it
was important to get input from the auditors, learn their problems, win their
trust. His instincts told him that was the surest route to real reform. Play
bad cop and you’ll only drive them away. . .
. . . McDonough hired 160 new PCAOB inspectors but only 20
enforcement officers. . . McDonough’s approach worked. The PCAOB
was able to sit down with auditors and hammer out a set of workable
standards that have since helped overhaul professional practice. (Martin)
Concern about the sufficiency of the process was discussed by an experienced
auditor, McDonnell, who noted:
The PCAOB made it clear the profession must regain the public’s
confidence or face severe censure. But the board’s decision to use an
inspection process to perform its oversight creates a high-risk environment
for the profession. In a February 2004 speech at the Economic Club of
Chicago, McDonough said the PCAOB inspection process would consist
of reviews of audit engagements to ensure compliance with securities
laws, the rules of the SEC and the PCAOB and the highest professional
standards.
Unfortunately, experience shows this approach provided little assurance
of mitigating the risk of audit failure. Even though such reviews were an
integral part of the internal quality control programs of audit firms for
years, they weren’t very effective in preventing audit failures. Why would
the PCAOB’s experience be any different? When I visited the PCAOB
several months ago and posed that question to George H. Diacont, the
PCAOB’s director of registration and inspections, he answered, “We’ll do it
better.” (McDonnell)
A similar concern about the adequacy of the overall process was noted by Alles
et. al. who noted:
Given its ambitious agenda to extend inspections beyond the Big 4, the
PCAOB should reflect on its experiences during both the 2004 and 2005
inspection programs and evaluate its procedures. For example, are the
inspections structured so they will help restore the credibility of the audit
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function? More importantly, will the PCAOB’s inspection process uncover
the underlying auditing and reporting problems that led to the creation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Probably not. (Alles, et al.)
Ciesielski noted the extent of inspections implied in SEC Chairman Cox’s
testimony in mid September (2006) by quoting Cox commenting about the SEC’s
concern about audits being done without wasted time and effort:
We anticipate that the SEC staff’s next inspection of the PCAOB will focus
on the PCAOB’s own inspection program for registered audit firms. In
particular, the staff will likely focus on the PCAOB’s inspection of audits
under PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2. . . .we hope to achieve greater
compliance with the Commission’s and the PCAOB’s own guidance that
these be risk-based and cost-effective. (Cox’s words as quoted in
Ciesielski, The AAO Weblog)
Ciesielski then noted:
In short, carrying out the task of auditing public companies in accordance
with the standards set by the PCAOB won’t be good enough – they have
to be efficiently done as well. Considering that the vast initial job of
documenting control systems and getting them in order is now out of the
way – at least, for firms above the $75 million market cap threshold – it’s
reasonable to expect that auditors re moving along the learning curve.
We’ll see when the PCAOB completes its inspections. (Ciesielski)
Results of Inspection
Gullapalli, in a Wall Street Journal article reported, after talking with companies
who had the results of their limited inspections, that:
In general, the companies [interviewed for the article] dub the change
superficial and say it didn’t have anything to do with their fundamentals. . ..
Still however small the dollars in these particular instances may be, some
accounting specialists see the accounting board’s close look at this
relatively obscure rule [reference to requirement in Emerging Issues Task
Force Issue No. 95-22: “Balance Sheet Classification of Borrowings
Outstanding under Revolving Credit Arrangements.”] as a possible
preview of more stringent rule enforcement in general. (Gullapalli)
Johnson noted that the “second round of official inspection reports related to the
Big Four audit firms” led to a “handful of negative headlines” which may reflect
the inadequacy of the shared information as well as the fact that the reports are
for past periods and do not truly reflect how the audit firms are currently
performing. As Johnson stated:
Using the terms “failed” and “failure” numerous times, the PCAOB cited
the firms for basic accounting issues, some of which relate to lease and
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tax accounting, revenue recognition, and goodwill-impairment testing. All
four of the reports, and the PCAOB’s previous evaluations of the Big
Four’s work, noted that in some instances the firms did not “identify or
appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of GAAP.”
(Johnson, Why the Big Four are Still a Mystery)
Leone noted that the 2005 inspections of two of the big four that were issued in
early January 2007. She commented:
. . . one report identifies 10 companies for which audits were deficient,
and says that in ‘some cases’ the errors appeared ‘likely to be material to
the issuer’s financial statements.’ The other report identifies 11 deficient
audits, and says that in ‘one case’ the result is likely to be material.
(Leone)
Leone noted that neither auditor changed any of its audit opinions as a result of
the PCAOB report or the completion of further procedures.
In responses to questions posed in an E-mail to Charles Niemeier, a
PCAOB Board member, a “behind-the-scenes” look was provided. In
response, for example, to the question: What do the 2005 inspections
reports on the Big Four tell us about the audit firms?, Niemeier stated:
. . . they are intended to focus firms on the areas where they can improve.
. . . I feel comfortable saying the firms have come a long way in identifying
and addressing risks to their audit quality, as a part of our inspections as
well as on their own. (Johnson, O&A: The PCAOB’s Charles Niemeier)
Disclosure Provided in Reports
The position of the Board for maintaining confidential sections of the inspection
report was stated clearly in the 2005 annual report noting the statutory limitation
of disclosures related to a firm’s quality control system. That requirement
“reflects a legislative policy choice encouraging self-correction.” Further
comment included:
The inspection report [the confidential portion, that is] encourages the firm
to initiate a dialogue with the Board’s inspection staff about how the firm
intends to address the criticism. The Board provides the opportunity for
dialogue so that a firm acting in good faith can receive timely feedback
from the staff and enhance its efforts accordingly before the 12-month
deadline. (2005 PCAOB Annual Report)
David Costello, CEO of the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy,
in an exclusive interview with The Practical Accountant, explained changes due
to Sarbanes-Oxley. He noted:
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The principal mission of boards of accountancy is to protect the public
through licensing qualified individuals and firms in the practice of
accountancy, and providing quality assurance to the public through
programs of continuing education, firm reviews, and when appropriate,
enforcement of its rules and regulations. While the role of boards hasn't
changed (i.e., its statutory mandate). SOX has indeed influenced the
methodologies of boards.
Most obvious is the public dissemination of the PCAOB's inspection
reports. Boards are now made aware of deficiencies in audit performance
earlier than under the previous firm-on-firm peer review process of the
profession. Some boards are seeking more information about deficiencies
in these inspection reports directly from their licensees. (Anonymous)
In an news article related to the issuance of the four limited audits issued on
August 26, 2004, Weil noted:
KPMG’s decision to voluntarily disclose the finding of potentially significant
conflicts [the inspection had found that the accounting firm had accepted
fees from independent-audit clients based on how much money it helped
them save in taxes] highlights how shrouded in secrecy the new agency’s
process will be. The other three firms . . . .declined to specify what
concerns, if any, the board raised about them in the confidential sections
of their reports.
Weil continued his discussion, noting:
When Congress created the Board, it acceded to pressure by the Big Four
firms to include a provision in the law under which the Board only would
disclose the existence of deficiencies in a firm’s quality controls if the firm
hadn’t fixed them within a year.
Weil quoted Turner, the SEC’s chief accountant from 1998 to 2001 who stated:
‘Congress needs to quickly bring that out into the sunshine.’ Weil also noted that
the other three big firms declined to discuss the confidential sections of their
reports. One of the three assured Weil that they did not intend to depart from
Congress’s process. (Weil)
5. Postulates Needed to Guide Behavior of Inspectors
While there is an explicit, straight-forward statement about the purpose of a
continuing program of inspections, the implementation in the policies and
practices of the PCAOB is not as clear. Section 104 of the Act states, as noted
earlier, that an inspection is to assess the degree of compliance . . .
The implication from such a statement of purpose is that there are objective
criteria for establishing compliance and that a process can be established that
will provide assurance that a firm is performing audits in conformity with such
13

criteria. Assumptions, that are accepted as postulates are needed to establish
the framework to guide the behavior of inspectors. A parallel to the postulates of
auditing promulgated by Mautz and Sharaf (see their The Philosophy of Auditing,
American Accounting Association, 1961) is needed.
The following is a suggested tentative set of postulates for consideration:
1. An inspector undertaking an inspection of an audit firm is acting only as an
inspector, who is a qualified, independent individual, whose integrity assures
acceptance of responsibility to determine the extent to which the audit firm is
adhering to the rules and standards specified.
2 An inspection is an objective engagement for which relevant evidence is
obtainable.
3. Evidence ranges from documentation maintained by the audit firm to evidence
that confirms what is provided in the documentation, including, but not limited to
observations, inquiries, and analyses of work completed.
4. The audit firm has an obligation to be cooperative, honest, and accepts the
value of such an investigation.
5. The inspection team is able to determine the materiality of deficiencies
disclosed during the inspection process and conclude its report with an objective
judgment relative to materiality as the report is prepared.
6. The audit firm’s response to the draft of the report is to be carefully reviewed
and judgments challenged are to be subjected to further review by another
designated review group.
7. There shall be provided sufficient information about the inspection process
and the findings that an interested reader has a clear understanding of both the
process and the findings, taking into account information that is perceived to be
best maintained confidentially.
8. The inspection process should be subjected to regular assessment for the
purpose of determining changes needed to assure higher reliability for findings
and improved methods that assure more timely reporting.
9. The information gathered from inspections related to quality control systems
should be analytically studied for discovery of behavioral and administrative
strategies that appear to result in high quality audits.
10. A persistent goal for inspections is to be the enhancement of audit quality to
the extent that there is perceived to be credibility in the audit reports provided to
audit clients.
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None of these refers to the scope, nature, or extent of public disclosure. Until a
number of years of inspection results are subjected to empirical statistical
analysis for validity and reliability there is no basis for disclosure of findings for
individual registered public accounting firms. Public disclosure of a compliance
score, for example, is not likely to be justified without such objective study. An
overall compliance report for a year’s audits could be disclosed publicly after the
establishment of valid measurement strategies.
6. Questions for an Assessment of the Inspection Process
The foregoing tentative postulates are inspired by what are perceived to be
potential flaws in the current inspection process. The following are merely
questions raised as a result of problems identified or implied in comments that
have appeared in inspection reports, conferences, newspapers, and in
conversations.
Is the role of an inspector confused?
The Board takes “a supervisory approach to oversight and seeks through
constructive dialogue to encourage firms to improve their practices and
procedures.” Is the inspector to be a counselor, a consultant? Is there no
awareness, as McDonnell noted (discussed earlier in this paper) that audit firms
have had quality control systems for decades. Yet, those systems were noted to
be lacking in what many would call basic components of such systems such as
appropriate segregation of duties of those responsible for monitoring ethics,
independence, client acceptance, and audit quality from those responsible for
audit operations. Should an inspector assume that an audit firm has an
understanding of quality control? Is it possible to be both an inspector and a
consultant?
Compliance implies the need for objective and clear criteria. Traditionally,
auditors are only auditors when they provide audits; they cannot at the same
time be a consultant.
How objective is the current inspection process?
How independent is an inspector if there is a continuing dialogue with members
of the audit firm? The inspector must gain information from staff and must
clarify the meaning of information provided. Inspection team members and
audit firm staff meeting on a continuing basis about deficiencies identified may
undermine the objectivity of decision making on the part of the inspection team.
How is objectivity safeguarded and assured in a supervisory environment?
How persuasive is the evidence obtained?
There are often references to the documentation read during an inspection.
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However, there is no information provided of additional evidence obtained to
provide corroboration of the documentation. Is it sufficient, for example, to read
memoranda (or emails) that state clearly that there are to be no sign offs on
procedures that have not been completed as a basis for concluding that such a
practice is not tolerated in this firm?
Inspection reports fail to reflect sensitivity, for example, to the hierarchy of
employees in public accounting firms as well as other likely attitudes that could
influence the nature of response of individuals. For example, reports identify
focus groups that include more than one level of employees. Seeking evidence
of how the tone at the top is perceived by staff members at the staff auditor level
when those staff auditors are included in the same group with seniors may fail to
get candid opinions.
Do inspectors get training in the art of asking questions, in observing, in
assessing behavioral factors that are basic skills developed among sociologists
and educators who undertaken field research studies and/or work with individuals
and groups to gain understanding of what is actually happening.
How does the inspector inform the audit client of its role?
There are often references to the “watchdog” role of the inspectors. Public
accounting firms have a long tradition of self-regulation. They had had more than
two decades of a peer review process under the auspices of the Public Oversight
Board that was gentle and essentially worthless. The imposition of a
government-driven oversight process breaks with tradition. The proper nature of
oversight is, possibly, not yet devised.
The failure of oversight was revealed in the extensive weaknesses in quality
control noted by the PCAOB. Yet, possibly, the positive conclusion of the first
report related to quality control weaknesses was justified during this initial period.
If such gentleness continues, the possibility of enhancing audit quality is likely not
realized. The statement in the PCAOB report doesn’t communicate clearly a
level of satisfaction but merely states: “the Board determined that the firm
addressed the quality control criticisms to the Board’s satisfaction for purposes of
Section 104 (g) (2) of the Act.” (PCAOB, Observations on the Initial
Implementation.)
The reality of the need for more systematic, objective oversight must be
communicated to audit firms. Reasonable accountants who understand their
public interest responsibilities will understand the need for credibility of audit
reports.
Another aspect of this question relates to the extent of public accounting
responsibility. In February 2008, the PCAOB proposed a new standard related to
public accounting firms conducting internal evaluations. In a brief article,
Johnson noted: that Scates of the PCAOB stated that: The engagement quality
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reviewers [of a registered firm] have a real potential to reduce after-the-fact audit
failures.” (Johnson, Auditor, Audit Thyself)
What is the threshold for materiality?
While a series of deficiencies in application of GAAP has value what does the
series reflect when the audit as a whole is considered? Somehow that question
should lead to a general statement about materiality for an inspection report that
can be communicated in the public portion of the report. It is not sufficient for the
Board to indicate that it is not a “score card.” However, we live in a society
where the sense of the whole is of great significance. Just as the auditor must
reflect an opinion about the financial statements taken as a whole, should not the
inspector be able to reflect a judgment about the adequacy of the application of
GAAP for the sample of audits inspected?
At what point should an audit firm receive a draft of a report?
From information disclosed, there have been problems with the timely completion
of an inspection report because of matters that were subject to challenge by the
audit firm. It is not clear who participates in resolving the challenges. There is
noted that it is the audit firm’s responsibility to determine whether or not a
proposed change in the treatment of a transaction, for example, will be accepted.
Is the process related to review of drafts optimum? Should inspectors, if among
themselves have varying opinions about the treatment of a transaction have
access to some review group – possibly, inspectors not participating in the
particular audit – to serve as a consultant? The matter presented to such a
group – or an outside group – can be presented in a manner that there is
absolutely no disclosure of the audit firm or the audit firm’s client that is the
subject of the unresolved matter.
Why is the written report provided to the public vague?
The initial limited audits resulted in reports that provided somewhat more
information than was provided in the full-scale audits. While the detailed strategy
may indeed need to be maintained confidential, there should be sufficient
disclosure that a reader has a macro sense of what is done during an inspection.
The reports of the full-scale inspection omit all information related to quality
control, because it is the judgment of the Board that confidentiality encourages
self-correction. This latter assumption may need to be explored empirically by
noting the extent to which there is indeed self correction observed in subsequent
inspections.
How does the Board review the inspection process?
There are delays in reporting, for example, that may be providing clues to
problems with the current structure. For example, the continuing interaction with
the client may prolong the process. Would it be more efficient to deal with
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conflicts between the perceptions of the inspection team and the client through
using a review group – from the inspection staff or an outside, competent group
of people – to come to a judgment about which explanation – the team’s or the
client’s -- is better?
Is information being analyzed?
The inspections provide a range of information heretofore not available for
empirical study of what actually is the behavior – and outcome – of audit
engagements. Now, there is being gathered information that will contribute to
understanding, for example firm characteristics, policies, and practices that
enhance quality performance – and undermine such performance. One of the
valuable outcomes of the inspection process is the accumulation of information
that may be of great value in learning what differentiates an office where effective
audits are standard outcomes and where there are significant number of audits
that are not effective. For too long there has been the “black box” of uncertainty
about external auditor behavior.
Can the value of quality audits be internalized?
External auditors, audit clients, and regulatory agencies must have a sustaining
belief that a reasonable goal is that audits be consistently effective and do
provide the reasonable assurance claimed in auditor reports.
How genuine is the interest in maintaining high quality in the performance of
audits? A common statement in the letters from firms attached to the inspection
reports is “Quality is our top priority and we are committed to continuously
improving our audit quality.” Is this statement made without impact on the reality
of how audits are indeed performed? As noted earlier, there is no general
conclusion about the degree of effectiveness of the audits performed by the firm
because of the nature of the process as explained by reports provided by the
PCAOB, As an illustration of the difficulty of interpreting statements that hint at
quality, consider the language used in discussing the extent to which the firms
responded to weaknesses in quality control:
. . . the Board believes that those firms have crafted and undertaken
important steps that, if conscientiously implemented, will have beneficial
effects on audit quality.(PCAOAB Release 104-2006-078)
Such a statement does not provide the reader with exactly what was the outcome
of the quality control issues raised and for which the firms had to submit reports
(Under Rule 4900 process) in response to the issue. The wording of the
PCAOB’s comment would lead a reader to believe that the firms are being
required to undertake practices that are brand new. Yet, quality control systems
are not new; as noted earlier, professional guidance about quality control has
been provided for decades. Has the Board identified why prior guidance was
seemingly ignored to a significant extent by public accounting firms?
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7. Summary
The discontent with the inspection process persists. Much of the discontent has
been deemed to be self-serving on the part of firms and issuers and seems not to
be influencing behavior of the PCAOB.
Such criticism deserves attention. Furthermore, a comprehensive, objective
review of the inspection process is justified. The Act of 2002 targeted a woefully
ineffective aspect of the self-regulatory strategies of the public accounting
industry. However, oversight that fails to meet its goal is not worthy of continuing
support.
The summary of this exploratory review is:
1. The Board continues to use the strategy established with the initial Board’s
deliberations. Does the Board plan to continue the current strategy which has
now been used for more than five years? Does the current strategy reflect the
need to begin with something less than a compliance engagement because of
the unanticipated problems encountered in attempting to assess compliance?
Possibly, the need for reform is an evolutionary process and a long learning
period is needed, notwithstanding that, in the case of public accounting, there
has been long-term regulation and oversight .
To date, it is not clear that the strategy is better than that provided by the Public
Oversight Board, which persisted for more than two decades without achieving
anticipated oversight success. There was no objective review of POB, for
example, after the first year or even the first five years.
2. The vague discussion of the actual inspection process established for a
particular engagement does not provide sufficient information to judge the nature
of the process.
3. The process has the tone of a consulting group that is attempting to be helpful
to individuals who do not seem to know accounting principles or are uncertain
about what is required for an audit engagement. The tone is not clearly one that
is objective and could lead to a reasonable conclusion that has meaning to all
interested in audit quality for the population of audit firms registered.
4. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reflected the need for a more reliable
oversight process than one then in use. The PCAOB is a new oversight Board.
Getting underway is not a simple task; it requires time. However, inasmuch as
oversight was not a new concept and there had been professional guidance for
auditors to follow, it is not quite clear how much introductory time is needed to
achieve an optimum and sufficiently rigorous oversight strategy to assure
confidence in the opinions expressed by external auditors.
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5. The current inspections do not provide sufficient information about an
assessment of auditor performance for the population of registered companies as
a whole. There has not been sufficient study of audit quality to give an inspected
firm a rating.
6. Oversight credibility of the PCAOB is still an uncertainty. Recent disclosures
of inadequate internal controls, including risk management, have been noted in
some major financial services organizations. Yet, such firms received
unqualified opinions about their internal controls. Were the weaknesses at a
level below significance?
7. Is there not a need for an established framework for an inspection that
determines compliance and includes postulates?
8. An objective, comprehensive assessment appears justified. For example, the
opinion of Neimeier that “ . . .I think both our inspections and firms’ own
initiataives are driving improvements” may indeed be the reality. Is it reality or
merely a wish? At this point, such an opinion needs to be transformed into an
hypothesis for empirical investigation.
What is provided here is exploratory. Nonetheless, tentatively there is support
for an objective assessment. That assessment must be comprehensive and go
beyond the one topic included here, the inspection process. The process, itself,
was selected for discussion, since it appeared to be the core driver of what the
Act of 2002 sought to achieve.
9. Beyond the inspection process, for example, there needs to be an answer to
the question: Is the current structure for oversight optimum? Why isn’t oversight
a direct, rather than a vague indirect, responsibility of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or of a newly constituted substitute for the Securities and
Exchange Commission?
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